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This Article explores the relationship between the legitimacy of 
international courts (ICs) and expansive judicial lawmaking. We 
compare lawmaking by three regional integration courts — the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the Andean Tribunal of 
Justice (ATJ), and the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (ECCJ). 
These courts have similar jurisdictional grants and access rules, 
yet each has behaved in a strikingly different way when faced with 
opportunities to engage in expansive judicial lawmaking. The CJEU 
is the most activist, but its audacious legal doctrines have been 
assimilated as part of the court’s legitimate authority. The ATJ and 
ECOWAS have been more cautious, but there is little to suggest that 
this caution has enhanced the legitimacy of either court. The ATJ has 
avoided serious challenges from governments, but its rulings have 
had little political impact. Conversely, the ECCJ’s circumspection 
has not shielded it from political opposition to its adjudication of 
clearly-established human rights. This pattern is at odds with the 
oft-voiced conventional wisdom that expansive judicial lawmaking 
undermines judicial legitimacy. Our modest goal in this Article is 
to problematize that claim and to posit an alternative hypothesis — 
that ICs spark legitimacy challenges due to the domestic political 
effects of their decisions, regardless of whether those decisions are 
expansionist.
*  Laurence R. Helfer is Harry R. Chadwick, Sr. Professor of Law, Duke University. 
Karen J. Alter is Professor of Political Science and Law, Northwestern University, 
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The last decade has witnessed a dramatic and rapid judicialization of international 
law. International courts and tribunals (ICs) now exercise jurisdiction over 
subjects as diverse as human rights, criminal law, trade, investment, and 
environmental protection. They include institutions that range from permanent 
courts to quasi-judicial and ad hoc review mechanisms, to international arbitral 
bodies. And they have left no region of the world untouched, extending their 
geographic reach to countries large and small, and rich and poor.1 
Spurred by the creation of new ICs, their swelling dockets, and the widening 
political impact of their rulings, scholars have created a cottage industry devoted 
to the study of international adjudication. The Project on International Courts 
and Tribunals and individual scholars have supplied new empirical evidence.2 
Oxford University Press has created a book series with more than a dozen 
volumes and a forthcoming Handbook of International Adjudication.3 Martinus 
Nijhoff has launched a new specialized journal.4 Several universities have 
established centers devoted to ICs.5 And journals are replete with symposia 
analyzing the law and politics of international adjudication.6 
1 See, e.g., Karen J. alter, the new terrain of international law (2013); Gary 
Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DuKe l.J. 775 (2012); 
Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International 
Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 Calif. l. rev. 899 
(2005).
2 ProJeCt on int’l Courts & tribunals, http://www.pict-pcti.org/ (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2012); see also eriK voeten, international Courts Data, http://www9.
georgetown.edu/faculty/ev42/ICdata.htm. 
3 Int’l Courts & Tribunals Series, oxforD univ. Press, http://ukcatalogue.oup.
com/category/academic/series/law/icts.do#.UArFnvk0WSp (last visited Jan. 
30, 2013); the oxforD hanDbooK of international aDJuDiCation (Cesare P. 
Romano, Karen J. Alter & Yuval Shany eds., forthcoming 2013). 
4 law & PraCtiCe int’l Cts. & tribunals, http://booksandjournals.brillonline.
com/content/15718034 (last visited Apr. 17, 2013).
5 E.g., iCourts: the Danish nat’l researCh founDation’s Ctr. of exCellenCe for 
int’l Courts, http://jura.ku.dk/icourts (last visited Apr. 17, 2013); erC ProJeCt 
on effeCtive int’l aDJuDiCation, http://www.effective-intl-adjudication.org (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2013); Multirights: the legitiMaCy of Multi-level huMan 
rights JuDiCiary, http://www.jus.uio.no/english/research/projects/multirights 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2013).
6 E.g., Special Issue: Legitimacy and the Future of the European Court of Human 
Rights, 12 gerMan l.J. 1707 (2011); Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, 
Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers, 12 gerMan 
l.J. 979 (2011); David D. Caron, Towards a Political Theory of International 
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The growing political salience of IC rulings has generated increased scrutiny 
of the legitimacy of ICs. As international judges adjudicate a widening array 
of controversies, they must inevitably clarify the meaning of ambiguous 
international rules and apply them to unforeseen contexts. They may also 
go further, using teleological methods of interpretation to broaden the reach 
of international law, expanding the types of actors who can file complaints, 
and awarding creative remedies that make legal rights more meaningful. The 
cumulative result of these trends is an expansion of IC authority and influence 
and a concomitant diminution of national autonomy. 
This Article explores the relationship between the legitimacy of ICs and 
expansive judicial lawmaking.7 Most of the existing literature focuses on 
legitimacy or on lawmaking, but does not directly consider the relationship 
between them. One group of studies argues that ICs operate within a strategic 
space — a zone of law that is bounded and mediated by politics.8 Another 
reveals that ICs that enjoy diffuse support have more room to issue controversial 
rulings that are unpopular with governments and to withstand the political 
opposition and resistance that such rulings often generate.9 Yet we have little 
empirical evidence to assess how an IC’s legitimacy affects its penchant for 
lawmaking, and vice versa. 
In this Article, we question the oft-voiced conventional wisdom that 
expansive judicial lawmaking undermines judicial legitimacy. We do so by 
comparing the evolution of three ICs situated, respectively, in Europe (the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)), Latin America (Tribunal 
Courts and Tribunals, 24 berKeley J. int’l l. 401 (2006); Rachel Cichowski, 
Courts, Democracy and Governance, 39 CoMP. Pol. stuD. 3 (2006); Kanstantsin 
Dzehtsiarou & Alan Greene, Legitimacy and the Future of the European Court 
of Human Rights, 12 gerMan l.J. 1707 (2011). 
7 For definitions of these terms, see infra Section I.A. 
8 E.g., Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, 
Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 aM. J. int’l l. 247 (2004); see 
also Laurence R. Helfer, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Theory of 
Constrained Independence, in international ConfliCt resolution 255 (Stefan 
Voigt et al. eds., 2006).
9 James Gibson & Gregory Caldeira, The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal 
Institutions: Compliance, Support, and the European Court of Justice, 39 aM. 
J. Pol. sCi. 459, 471 (1995) [hereinafter Gibson & Caldeira, ECJ Legitimacy] 
(defining diffuse support “as institutional commitment — that is, willingness 
to defend the [judicial] institution against structural and functional alterations 
that would fundamentally alter the role of the institution in society”); see also 
James Gibson & Gregory Caldeira, Changes in the Legitimacy of the European 
Court of Justice: A Post-Maastricht Analysis, 28 brit. J. Pol. sCi. 63 (1993).
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of Justice of the Andean Community (ATJ or the Tribunal)), and Africa (the 
Economic Community of West African States Community Court of Justice 
(ECCJ or the ECOWAS Court)). These ICs, which are all part of regional 
integration initiatives, have similar jurisdictional grants, access rules, and 
links to domestic courts. Each court reviews complaints from private litigants, 
governments, and supranational bodies, and each can receive preliminary 
references from national judges. The three ICs were also created for similar 
reasons: to provide a judicial venue for interpreting international rules and 
settling disputes relating to regional integration. Yet each court has behaved 
in a strikingly different way when faced with opportunities to engage in 
expansive judicial lawmaking. 
Judges on the CJEU are well known for boldly applying teleological 
methods of interpretation to expand the scope of E.U. law and their own 
power as the final arbiters of that law’s meaning. In Latin America, although 
Andean governments copied the CJEU’s design features, ATJ judges have 
eschewed opportunities to broadly construe their authority and to adopt 
purposive interpretations to advance regional integration. In West Africa, 
judges on the ECCJ followed yet a different path. When asked to hear a suit 
from a private litigant, the judges expressly declined to follow the CJEU’s 
activist approach and dismissed the case. Outside of the courtroom, however, 
ECCJ judges launched a successful advocacy campaign to convince ECOWAS 
member states to expand its jurisdiction and access rules. 
These divergent strategies and their outcomes are at odds with the 
conventional wisdom described above. The most expansive IC — the CJEU 
— faces occasional legitimacy challenges, but its famously expansive doctrines, 
such as the direct effect and supremacy of European law and implied powers 
for E.U. institutions, have been fully assimilated as part of the court’s legitimate 
authority. In contrast, the ATJ’s careful attention to its jurisdictional mandate 
has avoided serious challenges from Andean governments, but it has also 
relegated the Tribunal to a mostly politically marginal role. And the fact that 
the ECCJ obtained formal approval from states for expanding its jurisdiction 
has not shielded the court from government opposition to its rulings. 
This pattern suggests that there is no inherent relationship between expansive 
judicial lawmaking and challenges to IC legitimacy. The evidence is also 
consistent with an alternative hypothesis — that ICs trigger legitimacy challenges 
due to the domestic political impact of their decisions, regardless of whether 
those decisions are expansionist. Our modest goal in this Article, however, 
is not to develop an affirmative theory of international judicial legitimacy. 
Rather, we seek to problematize the putative link between lawmaking and 
legitimacy implied by public critiques of ICs and sometimes by scholars, 
and to offer this alternative hypothesis as a conjecture for future research. 
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The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview 
of the relationship between IC legitimacy and judicial lawmaking, drawing on 
a range of recent studies and examples. Part II, which builds on our previous 
publications and works in progress, describes the lawmaking strategies of three 
community courts: the CJEU, the ATJ, and the ECCJ. Part III concludes by 
positing that it is the domestic impact of a court’s decisions, rather than the 
extent of judicial lawmaking, that shapes political responses to ICs. 
I. the relatIonshIp Between legItImacy and  
lawmakIng By InternatIonal courts
The growing number of complaints filed with ICs around the world presents 
numerous opportunities for international judges to extend the reach of 
international law and their own review powers. Critics of ICs suggest that 
judges will inevitably seek to expand their power and reach, and that these 
expansions will inevitably compromise the courts’ legitimacy. We first explain 
our contrary view that expansive judicial lawmaking is not inherently linked 
to legitimacy. We then identify two types of lawmaking that are the most 
likely to raise legitimacy concerns.
A. Decoupling Legitimacy from Judicial Lawmaking
We adopt Nienke Grossman’s basic definition of “legitimate” ICs as those 
“whose authority is perceived as justified.”10 We also agree with James 
Gibson and Gregory Caldeira that legitimacy “provides courts authority; it 
allows them the latitude necessary to make decisions contrary to the perceived 
immediate interests of their constituents. Since courts typically have neither 
the power of the ‘purse nor the sword,’ this moral authority is essential to 
judicial effectiveness.”11 Factors that influence an IC’s legitimacy include 
“the fair and unbiased nature of the adjudicative body, commitment to the 
underlying normative regime that the body is interpreting and applying, and 
the body’s transparency and relationship with other democratic values.”12 
These analyses of IC legitimacy do not directly address judicial lawmaking. 
10 Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 41 geo. 
wash. int’l l. rev. 107, 110 (2009) (citing Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of 
International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental 
Law?, 93 aM. J. int’l l. 596, 600 (1999)).
11 Gibson & Caldeira, ECJ Legitimacy, supra note 9, at 460. 
12 Grossman, supra note 10, at 110; see also Andreas Follesdal, The Legitimacy 
Deficits of the Human Rights Judiciary: Elements and Implications of a Normative 
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Their silence implicitly reflects the widespread recognition that some degree of 
lawmaking — including activities such as “developing, adapting, modifying, 
filling gaps, interpreting, or even branching out in a new direction”13 — is 
an inevitable part of judging and thus a legitimate judicial function. Many 
treaties are the international equivalent of incomplete contracts, and judges 
often cannot avoid clarifying ambiguities or filling gaps in their texts.14 As the 
German Federal Constitutional Court recently asserted, judicial lawmaking is 
an inherent function of ICs that is “particularly warranted when it ‘concretizes 
programs’ (in the sense that it implements the normative project of a treaty), 
when it fills in legal gaps and when it solves contradictions.”15 
Yet there is also a broadly shared expectation that ICs that extend their 
jurisdiction or review powers beyond the boundaries imposed by states are likely 
to generate political frictions or backlashes.16 Some critics of ICs go further, 
arguing that such expansions necessarily undermine a court’s legitimacy by 
usurping the power of lawmaking bodies or transgressing the outer limits of 
delegated authority.17 Even national judges who accept the need for modest 
Theory, 14 theoretiCal inquiries l. 339, 345-46 (2013) (developing a taxonomy 
of different types of IC legitimacy).
13 MohaMeD shahabuDDeen, PreCeDent in the worlD Court 91 (2007) (quoting 
ICJ Judge Sir Robert Jennings); see also Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion 
in International Judicial Lawmaking, 43 va. J. int’l l. 631, 639 (2005) 
(“[I]nternational judges also frequently make law in the course of declarations 
pertaining to the existing law”).
14 E.g., Eyal Benvenisti, The Interplay Between Actors as a Determinant of the 
Evolution of Administrative Law in International Institutions, 68 law & ConteMP. 
Probs. 319 (2005); Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 
40 harv. int’l l.J. 333 (1999). 
15 Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, On the Democratic Legitimation of 
International Judicial Lawmaking, 12 gerMan l.J. 1341, 1345 (2011) 
(paraphrasing Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] July 6, 2010, docket no. 2 BvR 2661/06, ¶ 64 , available at http://www.
bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20100706_2bvr266106en.html, which considered 
a constitutional challenge to the CJEU’s Mangold judgment).
16 E.g., Eric Posner & John Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 
93 Calif. l. rev. 1, 21 (2005) (“If the tribunal violates its instructions and 
allows the personal preferences, ideological commitments, or national loyalties 
of its members to influence the judgment too much, then compliance might not 
occur”).
17 E.g., robert h. borK, CoerCing virtue: the worlDwiDe rule of JuDges (2003); 
eriC a. Posner, the Perils of global legalisM (2009); JereMy a. rabKin, 
law without nations? why Constitutional governMent requires sovereign 
states (2005).
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lawmaking by international judges assert that an IC acts ultra vires when it 
“goes against what is clearly stated in the text, or when it creates new rights 
or obligations without sufficient justification in the relevant positive law.”18 
A recent special issue of the German Law Journal explores these issues in 
greater depth. The contributions to this symposium link judicial lawmaking to 
various critiques that have been leveled against ICs, such as their contribution 
to democratic deficits or the fragmentation of international law. The studies 
suggest a transitive relationship whereby the association of expansive lawmaking 
with one or more of these critiques implies, syllogistically, that lawmaking 
itself undermines IC legitimacy.19  
We argue, to the contrary, that expansive judicial lawmaking is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for triggering challenges to IC legitimacy 
by powerful domestic actors. A court can engender such challenges simply by 
exercising the review functions that states have expressly and unambiguously 
delegated to it. Conversely, a court may, under the right conditions, boldly 
expand its power and receive a supportive or even laudatory response from 
governments. 
Examples of the first situation — challenges to an IC that acts scrupulously 
within its mandate — are sadly common for human rights tribunals. States 
voluntarily accept international review mechanisms when they ratify human 
rights treaties or accept optional complaints procedures; indeed, the whole 
point of tasking human rights tribunals with oversight powers is to hold 
governments accountable to their international pledges to respect individual 
liberties.20 Yet when the tribunals exercise these expressly delegated review 
powers, governments sometimes respond by contesting their legitimacy. 
For example, as we later explain in greater detail, ECOWAS member states 
expressly authorized the ECCJ to review complaints from private litigants 
alleging violations of their human rights. Yet when the court received credible 
evidence of arbitrary detention and torture by security forces in Gambia, the 
state argued that the ECCJ’s exercise of jurisdiction was “an affront to [its] 
sovereignty.”21
18 Von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 15, at 1345 (paraphrasing docket no. 2 BvR 
2661/06, ¶ 105, in which the German Federal Constitutional Court concluded that 
the CJEU, in a 2005 judgment, had “manifestly transgressed the competences 
granted to it to interpret Community law . . . and acted ultra vires”).
19 E.g., von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 15, at 1368 (“Our introductory piece 
has identified problems in the democratic legitimation of international judicial 
lawmaking. Our concluding contribution shows that there are promising strategies 
to respond, but that no solutions are readily available to ease all concerns.”). 
20 alter, supra note 1, ch. 2.
21 Musa Saidykhan v. Republic of the Gambia, ECW/CCJ/RUL/05/09 ¶ 11 (Interim 
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The second situation — a court that expands its authority with the support 
or acquiescence of states — occurs where governments and other influential 
domestic actors develop a preference for stronger judicial review after an 
IC has been established. Later, we discuss the CJEU’s expansion of its own 
authority to review human rights claims, an enlargement that E.U. member 
states subsequently endorsed.22 Another example is the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR)’s pilot judgment procedure, a judicial innovation for 
efficiently resolving hundreds or even thousands of complaints challenging the 
same human rights violations.23 Commentators widely view the pilot judgment 
procedure as successful, both in inducing governments to resolve systemic 
human rights violations and in helping the ECtHR to reduce its backlog of 
pending cases. But they also agree that the court has no formal authority to 
create the procedure.24 Rather, the legitimacy of the court’s initial adoption of 
these practices stemmed from a vague, nonbinding resolution of the Council 
of Europe’s Committee of Ministers,25 and from the “consensual subsequent 
practice of the state parties.”26 
B. Where Judicial Lawmaking Raises Legitimacy Concerns
Some judge-made augmentations of authority may engender political 
controversies and thus call a court’s legitimacy into question. We define such 
expansive lawmaking as occurring when ICs “identify new legal obligations 
or constraints not found in treaty texts or supported by the intentions of their 
drafters, and when these obligations or constraints narrow states’ discretion.”27 
Two types of expansionist lawmaking are especially likely to raise legitimacy 
Ruling of June 30, 2009) (on file with authors) (quoting government’s preliminary 
objection).
22 See infra Section III.A. 
23 See, e.g., Antoine Buyse, The Pilot Judgment Procedure at the European Court 
of Human Rights: Possibilities and Challenges, 57 noMiKo viMa 1890 (2009); 
Markus Fyrnys, Expanding Competences by Judicial Lawmaking: The Pilot 
Judgment Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights, 12 gerMan l.J. 
1231 (2011).
24 Fyrnys, supra note 23, at 1251-53.
25 Council of Europe, Resolution (2004)3 of the Committee of Ministers on 
Judgments Revealing an Underlying Systemic Problem (May 12, 2004), available 
at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=743257&Lang=en. 
26 Fyrnys, supra note 23, at 1252.
27 Karen J. Alter & Laurence R. Helfer, Nature or Nurture? Judicial Law-Making 
in the European Court of Justice and the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 64 int’l 
org. 563, 566 (2010). 
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concerns — the use of aggressively teleological or purposive methods of 
treaty interpretation, and the expansion of an IC’s mandate to encompass 
subject areas that states have not expressly delegated to it. 
Many international agreements lay out general principles that states expect 
to be filled in later in various ways, including by the adoption of supplementary 
texts, reference to the practices of treaty parties, and interpretation by ICs. 
When judges fill in details that have been left unspecified, their lawmaking is 
generally uncontroversial. Yet litigants sometimes ask ICs to use interpretation 
to achieve bolder aims, such as augmenting existing rules to substitute for 
missing secondary legislation, converting nonbinding declarations of intent into 
binding and enforceable obligations, or conferring a quasi-constitutional status 
on certain treaty provisions.28 These litigant demands force ICs to confront 
tough political choices. Judges must determine how fast and how far states 
are willing to move toward achieving a legal regime’s broad goals, and to 
what extent they narrow state discretion or push states to realize those goals. 
In Europe, the CJEU declared that certain commitments in the Treaty 
of Rome29 had direct effect in national legal orders, and it interpreted those 
commitments to catalyze integration when political support for the E.U. project 
had stalled.30 Yet the CJEU was acutely aware that its aggressive lawmaking 
created a risk of backlash from governments and national judges. To reduce this 
risk, the court used the E.U. Commission “as a political bellwether, watching 
its position on major cases as a sign of what the political traffic [would] 
bear.”31 It also introduced new pro-integration legal doctrines gradually and 
with qualifications. “If there [we]re not too many protests,” these judicial 
innovations were “re-affirmed in later cases; the qualifications . . . whittled 
away and the full extent of the doctrine[s] revealed.”32 Even with these cautious 
maneuvers, however, the court occasionally misjudged the political landscape 
and provoked efforts to reverse or qualify expansive CJEU rulings.33
28 ICs that act in these ways are often accused of judicial “activism,” a term that 
critics often use as a conclusory epithet to attack decisions that they disfavor. 
E.g., Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DePaul l. 
rev. 555 (2010). For a recent discussion of activism by ICs, see Fuad Zarbiyev, 
Judicial Activism in International Law — A Conceptual Framework for Analysis, 
3 J. int’l DisP. settleMent 247 (2012). 
29 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
30 E.g., Joseph Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character of 
Supranationalism, 1 y.b. eur. law 257 (1981).
31 Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 315.
32 trevor hartley, the founDations of euroPean CoMMunity law 78-79 (1994). 
33 Karen J. alter, The European Union’s Legal System and Domestic Policy: 
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Legitimacy concerns can also arise when ICs extend their mandates beyond 
the unambiguous limits prescribed by governments. A prominent illustration 
relates to sub-regional courts in Africa. The treaty establishing the East 
African Community Court of Justice (EACJ) expressly excludes human 
rights and contemplates the later adoption of a protocol to extend the court’s 
jurisdiction to human rights cases.34 To date, however, such a protocol has not 
been adopted, leading commentators — and the court itself — to conclude 
that that the EACJ “has no jurisdiction where infringements that occur relate 
. . . to the human or other individual rights of the residents.”35 Nevertheless, 
since 2007 the EACJ has decided that it would “not abdicate from exercising 
its jurisdiction of interpretation under [the EAC Treaty] merely because [a 
complaint] includes allegations of human rights violation[s]”36 — in effect 
reaching the same result through a purposive interpretation of the treaty. 
These decisions — as well as recent human rights decisions from the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal37 — have been 
criticized as “nothing short of extreme judicial activism, skewed towards a 
usurpation of legislative functions.”38 East African Community (EAC) member 
Spillover or Backlash?, in the euroPean Court’s PolitiCal Power: seleCteD 
essays 184 (2009).
34 Solomon T. Ebobrah, Litigating Human Rights Before Sub-Regional Courts in 
Africa: Prospects and Challenges, 17 afr. J. int’l & CoMP. l. 79, 82 (2009). 
35 T.O. Ojienda, The East African Court of Justice in the Re-established East Africa 
Community: Institutional Structure and Function in the Integration Process, 11 
e. afr. J. PeaCe & huM. rts. 220, 228 (2005).
36 James Katabazi v. Sec’y Gen. of the E. Afr. Cmty. (E. Afr. Ct. of Just., Nov. 
1, 2007), available at http://www.eacj.org/docs/judgements/JUDGMENT_
REFERENCE_NO._1_OF_2007.pdf.
37 Solomon T. Ebobrah, Human Rights Developments in African Sub-Regional 
Economic Communities During 2010, 11 afr. huM. rts. J. 216, 246 (2011): 
While no express human rights competence is conferred on the [SADC] 
Tribunal, since 2007 the Tribunal has understood its power to interpret 
and apply the SADC Treaty as sufficient to adjudicate on claims that 
human rights have been violated in an SADC member state contrary to 
the provisions of the SADC Treaty.
38 Lucyline Nkatha Murungi & Jacqui Gallinetti, The Role of Sub-Regional Courts 
in the African Human Rights System, 7 int’l J. huM. rts. 119, 133 (2010). The 
controversy stems from Tribunal decisions that challenged President Robert 
Mugabe’s postcolonial land redistribution policies seizing land from white 
farmers. See Precious N. Ndlovu, Campbell v. Republic of Zimbabwe: A Moment 
of Truth for the SADC Tribunal, 1 saDC l.J. 63 (2011); Mwiza Jo Nkhata, The 
Role of Regional Economic Communities in Protecting and Promoting Human 
Rights in Africa: Reflections on the Human Rights Mandate of the Tribunal of 
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states have opposed the EACJ’s assertion of a human rights competence in 
pleadings before the court. But they have not — at least not yet — challenged 
that competence politically.39 The SADC Tribunal, in contrast, has experienced 
an intense backlash from member countries in the form of a suspension of 
the court’s operations in 2011 and the adoption in 2012 of a new protocol 
that removes access by private litigants — moves widely seen as ending the 
Tribunal’s power to review challenges to member states’ human rights practices.40
Taken together, these examples suggest that certain types of expansive IC 
lawmaking — in particular, the use of aggressively teleological interpretive 
methods or the expansion of subject matter competencies — sometimes 
trigger legitimacy challenges. But the examples do not support the broader 
proposition that expansive judicial lawmaking is a necessary or a sufficient 
condition for such challenges. To the contrary, as we now illustrate, even 
ICs with similar design features have adopted widely divergent approaches 
to judicial lawmaking, engendering responses by states that range from 
endorsement to acquiescence to opposition.
II. the dIvergent lawmakIng strategIes of the  
cJeu, the atJ, and the eccJ
This Part summarizes the divergent approaches to judicial lawmaking by three 
international courts — the CJEU, the ATJ, and the ECCJ. Although these 
courts operate in different legal, political, and institutional contexts, their 
divergent lawmaking strategies are especially striking given that the three 
the Southern African Development Community, 20 afr. J. int’l & CoMP. l. 87 
(2012).
39 In late 2006, in response to a ruling by the EACJ, the member states amended 
the EAC Treaty to create an appellate division of the EACJ, impose time limits 
on private actors filing suits with the court, and add new grounds for removing 
and suspending judges. Henry Onoria, Botched-Up Elections, Treaty Amendments 
and Judicial Independence in the East African Community, 54 J. afr. l. 74, 83 
(2010). These amendments became effective before the EACJ adopted a purposive 
interpretation of the EAC Treaty relating to human rights. The relationship, if 
any, between the amendments and the court’s human rights case law remains 
to be explored.
40 Press release, allAfrica, SADC Leaders Deal Fatal Blow to SADC Tribunal — 
Shock Decision Denies Citizens Access to the Court (Aug. 20, 2012), available 
at http://allafrica.com/stories/201208200629.html. For further discussion, see 
Nkhata, supra note 38, at 96-109; Werner Scholtz, Review of the Role, Functions 
and Terms of Reference of the SADC Tribunal, 1 saDC l.J. 197, 197-201 (2011).
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courts’ jurisdictions and access rules are very similar, and that the ATJ and 
the ECCJ were modeled on the CJEU. These differences suggest that copying 
the design features of an IC that engages in expansive lawmaking does not 
necessarily copy that court’s penchant for finding new legal obligations or 
narrowing state discretion.
A. CJEU: Using Expansive Lawmaking Aggressively to Promote Integration 
When the CJEU was established in the 1950s, its judgments were binding 
under international law, but the court had no way to enforce its decisions or 
to penetrate national legal orders. Over the ensuing forty years, however, the 
CJEU transformed the Treaty of Rome41 and secondary legislation into legal 
rules that are directly enforceable in cases filed by private litigants in domestic 
courts. The CJEU’s foundational doctrines declaring European law’s direct 
domestic effect, its supremacy over national law, and its preemptive power 
were created not by the treaty’s drafters but by the court itself. Other CJEU 
innovations included implied powers for supranational lawmaking and the 
development of a human rights jurisprudence to check potential excesses of 
E.U. institutions.42 Perhaps most remarkably, each of these doctrines — and the 
CJEU’s authority to articulate and extend them — were ultimately embraced 
by national judiciaries across Europe.43  
The CJEU justified these doctrinal innovations as necessary to give effect 
to the Treaty of Rome.44 The CJEU’s expansions have been widely hailed 
41 Treaty of Rome, supra note 29.
42 Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 yale l.J. 2403 (1991).
43 This discussion builds on an extensive body of research on the CJEU. Readers 
interested in more detailed analysis should consult publications including: Karen 
J. alter, establishing the suPreMaCy of euroPean law: the MaKing of a rule 
of law in euroPe (2001); the euroPean Courts anD national Courts: DoCtrine 
anD JurisPruDenCe (Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone-Sweet & Joseph Weiler 
eds., 1998).
44 CJEU judge Pierre Pescatore has cogently written of these innovations: 
This philosophy is very simple indeed. It means that legal rules, by their 
very nature, have a practical purpose. Any legal rule is devised so as to 
operate effectively (we are accustomed, in French, to speak here about 
effet utile). If it is inoperative, it is not a rule of law. The task of lawyers 
is therefore not to thwart effects of legal rules, but to help in putting them 
into operation. In other words, practical operation for all concerned, which 
is nothing else than “direct effect,” must be considered as being the normal 
condition of any rule of law. 
 Pierre Pescatore, The Doctrine of “Direct Effect”: An Infant Disease of Community 
Law, 8 eur. l. rev. 155, 155 (1983).
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as advancing integration through law when political support for a European 
common market had faltered. The court is credited with transforming the 
Treaty of Rome from a traditional instrument of public international law into 
a constitutional charter for regional integration.45
Although the CJEU used the language of the law to justify its purposive 
interpretations, the judges also acknowledged that they realized these 
achievements by carefully nurturing relationships with stakeholders who favored 
the court’s bold maneuvers. CJEU judges and members of the Commission’s 
legal secretariat regularly participated in events for scholars and practitioners of 
E.U. law. The court invited national judges to Luxembourg to discuss European 
legal issues and share in fine dining. These outreach efforts were designed to 
encourage preliminary references, a mechanism that enabled domestic courts 
to seek the CJEU’s guidance as to the meaning of European law.46 
Spurred by requests from private litigants who benefitted from E.U. rules, 
national judges, lawyers, and scholars became the CJEU’s primary interlocutors 
and compliance partners. As judges referred a growing number of cases, they 
became habituated to following CJEU preliminary rulings and to adjudicating 
the treaty-compatibility of domestic laws. With European rules woven into 
the fabric of national judicial rulings, governments could not defy the CJEU 
without also calling into question the independence and authority of their own 
courts. As Joseph Weiler has explained, “[w]hen a national court accepts the 
[CJEU’s] ruling, the compliance pull of Community law becomes formidable.”47
Inasmuch as judges at all levels of national legal systems can seek preliminary 
rulings, individuals and firms have had access to multiple venues in which 
to pursue E.U. litigation, and the CJEU has had numerous opportunities to 
develop and refine the content of European rules. The interaction between CJEU 
judges and their domestic colleagues has shaped the scope and substance of 
45 E.g., G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, 26 CoMMon 
MKt. l. rev. 595, 605 (1989); Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of 
a Transnational Constitution, 75 aM. J. int’l l. 1 (1981).
46 As CJEU judge G. Federico Mancini has explained, the “Court’s first preoccupation” 
was to win the “co-operation and goodwill of the state courts.” Mancini, supra 
note 45, at 605. The CJEU’s outreach efforts are discussed in Karen alter, 
Jurist Advocacy Movements in Europe: The Role of Euro-Law Association in 
European Integration (1953-1975), in the euroPean Court’s PolitiCal Power: 
seleCteD essays, supra note 33, at 63, 65-72. 
47 Joseph Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and Its 
Interlocutors, 26 CoMP. Pol. stuD. 510, 519 (1994). For further discussion, see 
Karen alter, Who Are the ‘Masters of the Treaty’?: European Governments 
and the European Court of Justice, in the euroPean Court’s PolitiCal Power: 
seleCteD essays, supra note 33, at 109, 117-23.
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European law, leading to extensions of legal rules regulating the free movement 
of goods, gender equality, environmental protection and human rights.48
It is instructive to contrast the CJEU’s expansion into human rights with 
the previous discussion of the EACJ and SADC Tribunal. As Weiler has 
explained, the Treaty of Rome did not include a bill of rights and did not 
authorize the CJEU to hear suits alleging human rights violations. Weiler 
saw the CJEU’s decision to extend its competence to human rights issues as 
a reflection of its pretensions to be a constitutional tribunal. He recognized, 
however, that national judges supported — even demanded — this doctrinal 
evolution.49 More recent scholarship links these developments to unresolved 
political debates that later spilled over into litigation. According to Gráinne 
de Búrca, German negotiators tried but failed to insert human rights into the 
E.U. treaties. Litigants then raised human rights claims in German courts. 
When these cases reached the CJEU, the judges at first refused to embrace 
human rights review. De Búrca explains the CJEU’s subsequent “volte face” 
as necessary to support the supremacy of European law and to rebuff “claims 
that Community law must be subordinate to national constitutional rights.”50 
Member states later enshrined the CJEU’s lawmaking into European legal 
texts, formally delegating to the court an express human rights competence.51
There have also been debates in Southern and East Africa about the legality 
and wisdom of regional courts embracing human rights. Yet as previously 
described, the reaction has been strikingly different than in Europe, leading 
governments to narrow or abrogate private litigants’ access to the tribunals 
in those regions.52 There are several possible explanations for these divergent 
responses. First, unlike in Africa, the CJEU reluctantly expanded its human 
rights authority in response to demands from important domestic compliance 
partners — national courts. In addition, the ECJ’s human rights review 
was initially confined to E.U. institutions and did not extend to national 
governments. Third, early CJEU human rights cases focused on legal issues 
that were closely linked to regional integration.53 
48 aleC stone sweet, the JuDiCial ConstruCtion of euroPe (2004); Gráinne de 
Búrca, Roads Not Taken: The EU as a Global Human Rights Actor, 105 aM. J. 
int’l l. 649, 665-68 (2011).
49 Weiler, supra note 42, at 2417 (“[E]ven if protection of human rights per se need 
not be indispensable to fashioning a federal-type constitution, it was critical to 
the acceptance by courts in the Member States”). 
50 De Búrca, supra note 48, at 668. 
51 Id. at 687.
52 See supra Section I.B. 
53 De Búrca, supra note 48, at 667-70. De Búrca charts the expansion of the CJEU’s 
human rights jurisprudence following the Maastricht Treaty, id. at 670-73.
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The CJEU’s aggressive bolstering of European integration and enlarging 
of E.U. law has not been without missteps. There have been a range of 
challenges by governments to particular expansive applications of existing 
doctrines, but these have been episodic and usually focused on the outcomes 
of specific cases.54 Despite these concerns, member states have repeatedly 
expanded the court’s jurisdiction — in 1988, by creating the Tribunal of First 
Instance (now the General Court); in 1993, by authorizing financial sanctions 
for noncompliance with CJEU rulings; and in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, by 
giving the court jurisdiction over certain justice and home affairs issues.55 The 
result, on balance, has been an implicit affirmation by European governments 
of the CJEU’s doctrinal innovations and their associated expansions of the 
court’s authority. 
B. The ATJ: Deference to Member States, Except for Intellectual Property 
Issues56
The Andean Pact, a South American regional integration initiative launched 
in 1969, initially did not include a community court. When member states 
decided to create a judicial body to interpret and help enforce Andean rules, 
54 alter, supra note 46, at 128-32. For a debate about member state reversals of 
ECJ decisions, see MarK PollaCK, the engines of integration: Delegation, 
agenCy, anD agenCy setting in the euroPean union ch. 2 (2003); Geoffrey 
Garrett et al., The European Court of Justice, National Governments and Legal 
Integration in the European Union, 52 int’l org. 149 (1998). 
55 De Búrca, supra note 48, at 649. The Treaty of Amsterdam included provisions 
granting the E.U. competence over certain justice and home affairs issues. The 
Lisbon Treaty made a number of additional changes to these competences, 
including the greater involvement of the CJEU. See Elizabeth F. Defei, Human 
Rights, the European Union, and the Treaty Route: From Maastricht to Lisbon, 
35 forDhaM int’l l.J. 1207 (2012). 
56 The discussion in this Section builds on our previously published research on 
the Andean legal system. Readers interested in more detailed analysis should 
refer to the following publications: Alter & Helfer, supra note 27; Karen J. 
Alter & Laurence R. Helfer, Legal Integration in the Andes: Law-Making by the 
Andean Tribunal of Justice, 17 eur. l.J. 701 (2011); Karen J. Alter, Laurence 
R. Helfer & Osvaldo Saldias, Transplanting the European Court of Justice: The 
Experience of the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 60 aM. J. CoMP. l. 629 (2012); 
Laurence R. Helfer & Karen J. Alter, The Andean Tribunal of Justice and Its 
Interlocutors: Understanding the Preliminary Ruling Reference Patterns in the 
Andean Community, 42 n.y.u. J. int’l & Pol. 871 (2009) [hereinafter Helfer 
& Alter, Interlocutors]; Laurence R. Helfer, Karen J. Alter & Maria Florencia 
Guerzovich, Islands of Effective International Adjudication: Constructing an 
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they looked to Europe for guidance. The ATJ, which began operations in 
1984, is a close copy of the CJEU. It has very similar jurisdictional provisions 
and access rules, including a preliminary reference mechanism. The ATJ’s 
founders were also aware of key doctrines that the CJEU had developed to 
promote European integration. 
When the Andean Tribunal first began to hear cases in 1987, it emulated 
CJEU jurisprudence. Early ATJ rulings confirmed key E.U. doctrines — that 
Andean law had direct effect and supremacy over national law, and preempted 
conflicting domestic legislation. Whereas European judges had created these 
doctrines themselves, the ATJ suggested that member states had implicitly 
endorsed them.57 
When it came to applying these doctrines, however, Andean judges diverged 
from the CJEU in several significant respects. The ATJ declined to serve as 
an engine of Andean integration. Formally, the ATJ views the Cartagena 
Agreement58 — the treaty that established the Andean Community — as higher-
order law. But the Tribunal has also emphasized that the Andean legal order 
is a product of member state consent. And it has scrupulously respected that 
consent when interpreting the treaty and Andean secondary legislation.59 The 
ATJ’s deferential review of government decisions gives political leaders wide 
discretion to control the scope and pace of integration to reflect the waxing 
and waning of their collective commitment to creating a common market.60
ATJ judges have also avoided the purposive interpretations that are the 
CJEU’s hallmark,61 rejecting the pleas of private litigants to imply legal 
rights and obligations from the structure of the community legal system. As 
compared to the CJEU, the ATJ has given governments far greater leeway to 
adopt national laws in areas of community competence, and it has refused 
to imply powers for Andean institutions. For example, the ATJ announced 
the principle of complemento indispensable: even in areas where Andean 
law clearly governs, member states may enact domestic laws necessary to 
implement a community rule provided that the laws do not obstruct or nullify 
the community rule.62 In addition, when responding to requests for preliminary 
Intellectual Property Rule of Law in the Andean Community, 103 aM. J. int’l 
l. 1 (2009).
57 Alter & Helfer, supra note 27, at 571. 
58 Andean Subregional Integration Agreement, May 26, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 910.
59 For example, the ATJ refused to elevate the Cartagena Agreement over Andean 
legislation that permitted governments to exempt goods on a list of exceptions 
to free trade rules. Alter & Helfer, supra note 27, at 572. 
60 Id. at 579.
61 Pescatore, supra note 44, at 155.
62 Alter & Helfer, supra note 27, at 571.
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rulings, the Tribunal generally explicates the meaning of Andean law in the 
abstract without applying that law to the facts of the case or giving more 
than nominal guidance as to how national judges should resolve the dispute. 
We attribute the ATJ’s reticence to the judges’ understanding that they lack 
the deep political and legal support needed to promote legal integration more 
aggressively. Local demand for integration is generally weak, reflecting the fact 
that intraregional trade is far less important to Andean countries than trade with 
non-member countries. With less at stake economically, private litigants have 
filed only a modest number of challenges to national laws or regulations that 
conflict with Andean rules. And national judges have generally refrained from 
invaliding such laws even when the violation of community law is manifest. 
Lacking a domestic constituency that favors expansive judicial lawmaking, 
the ATJ has proceeded cautiously. This approach has avoided direct clashes 
with governments, but it has also rendered the Tribunal far less relevant to 
the integration process than its European counterpart.63
However, in the one corner of the Andean legal system where the ATJ can 
count on strong domestic support, the Tribunal has been significantly bolder. 
Our previous studies reveal that the subject matter of ATJ preliminary rulings 
is highly concentrated — more than ninety-five percent involve challenges to 
decisions by domestic administrative agencies to grant or deny applications 
to register trademarks, patents and other intellectual property (IP) rights.64 
This striking statistic underscores the extent to which domestic IP agencies 
in the Andes have acted as the ATJ’s primary interlocutors. 
Our research revealed that the agencies — which applied Andean IP rules 
to decide whether to register patents and trademarks — actively encouraged 
references to the ATJ and regularly consulted and applied the Tribunal’s 
rulings. As we explain elsewhere, the agencies were reorganized in the 1990s 
as part of a wave of free-market reforms and were staffed by a professional 
cadre of foreign-trained lawyers. In addition, Andean IP law was a new and 
technical subject about which domestic actors had little knowledge. Agency 
administrators thus turned to the ATJ to help them address these complex 
issues. Over time, the Tribunal developed a symbiotic relationship with the 
agencies, responding to their requests for guidance and interpreting Andean IP 
rules in ways that reflected the practices and goals of agency administrators.65 
Most ATJ IP decisions concern narrow issues with relatively low political 
salience. But a few noncompliance judgments have been more consequential. 
In these disputes, national actors initially followed domestic decrees that 
63 Id. at 582-84.
64 Helfer & Alter, Interlocutors, supra note 56, at 893-94. 
65 Helfer, Alter & Guerzovich, supra note 56, at 11-13, 22-24.
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conflicted with Andean IP rules. These actors changed course, however, after 
the ATJ ordered the agencies to comply with Andean law. The ATJ’s rulings 
made it more difficult for member states to defect from community-wide 
standards in response to pressure from foreign governments to adopt stronger 
IP protection rules. Yet ATJ litigation has not spilled over to tariffs, taxes, 
customs or other subjects regulated by the community, primarily because the 
Tribunal lacks domestic interlocutors and compliance constituencies willing 
to file suits to enforce those regulations. The net result is that IP remains an 
island of effective international adjudication surrounded by a sea of Andean 
rules that are under-enforced and often circumvented by domestic actors.66
C. The ECCJ: Building Legitimacy Through Publicity and Extrajudicial 
Advocacy67
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) followed an 
early trajectory similar to its predecessor in South America. When fifteen 
West African nations established ECOWAS in 1975, they emulated the E.U.’s 
political institutions but did not create a supranational court.68 The founders 
envisioned that a court would eventually be needed,69 but they did not act on 
this plan for more than fifteen years. A 1991 protocol established a blueprint 
for an international tribunal to interpret ECOWAS legal instruments in disputes 
between member states or between a member state and a community institution.70 
However, the actual creation of the ECCJ and the appointment of its inaugural 
group of judges were delayed for another decade. And when the court finally 
opened its doors for business in 2001, the member states refrained from filing 
any cases, leaving the ECCJ with nothing to do.
The first suit to reach the ECCJ was filed in 2003 by a Nigerian goods 
trader, Olajide Afolabi, who challenged Nigeria’s unilateral closure of its border 
66 Id. at 26-30, 36-39.
67 This Section draws on our ongoing research on the ECOWAS legal system and 
the ECCJ, see Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Jacqueline R. McAllister, A 
New International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community 
Court of Justice, 108 aM. J. int’l l. (forthcoming Oct. 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2107427.
68 Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), May 
28, 1975, 1010 U.N.T.S. 17, 14 I.L.M. 1200.
69 See id. arts. 11, 56.
70 Protocol A/P.1/7/91 on the Community Court of Justice, art. 9.3, July 7, 1991, 
available at http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/treaty/ECOWAS_Protocol_
Court_of_Justice.pdf, reprinted in CoMPenDiuM of afriCan sub-regional huMan 
rights DoCuMents 194 (Solomon Ebobrah & Armand Tanoh eds., 2010). 
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with Benin.71 Afolabi claimed that the border closure violated ECOWAS rules 
guaranteeing the free movement of persons, goods, and capital, as well as a 
provision of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights that protects 
the right to freedom of movement. Nigeria challenged the ECCJ’s jurisdiction 
and Afolabi’s standing to bring the suit. Afolabi countered by urging the ECCJ 
to adopt a purposive interpretation of the 1991 Protocol that would advance 
integration by granting individuals direct access to the ECCJ where their own 
government had violated ECOWAS rules.72
The judges acknowledged the case’s sympathetic facts, which highlighted 
the serious barriers to intraregional trade in West Africa.73 Nevertheless, the 
court concluded that the 1991 Protocol was “unambiguous” on the issues of 
jurisdiction and standing,74 and must therefore be “applied as written,” even 
if the result — effectively insulating member states against suits by their 
own nationals — seemed “repugnant,” “absurd[]” or “harsh.”75 The ECCJ 
contrasted its interpretive approach with that of the CJEU, whose “activist[] 
judges” had “extend[ed] its review on jurisdiction to cover bodies which 
were not listed in the Treaty,” and “fill[ed] in gaps in” European law.76 Noting 
that “some of the [CJEU’s] decisions [have] attracted criticisms,” the ECCJ 
candidly concluded: “We therefore do not want to tow on the same line.”77 
The ECCJ’s strict interpretation of the 1991 Protocol may seem surprising. 
Rather than deploy a purposive analysis to infer the power to adjudicate 
complaints from private litigants, the judges concluded that the ECOWAS 
member states must expressly confer such authority. Given the reluctance 
of West African governments to challenge each other’s noncompliance with 
ECOWAS economic rules, ECCJ judges surely would have anticipated that 
their decision would result in a continued absence of cases from its docket.
Yet if the judges’ interpretation of ECOWAS legal instruments was narrow 
and formalist, their behavior outside of the courtroom was strikingly different. 
71 Olajide Afolabi v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, ECW/CCJ/JUD/01/04 (Apr. 27, 
2004), reprinted in 2004-2009 CMty. Ct. of Just., eCowas law rePort 1 
(2011). 
72 Id. ¶¶ 14-15, 23, 41.
73 Id. ¶ 55.
74 Id. ¶ 59.
75 Id. ¶¶ 37, 54. 
76 Id. ¶ 56.
77 Id. The ATJ also dismissed its first case — a suit by a private litigant — because 
the Cartagena Agreement did not expressly authorize such suits. But the ATJ also 
indicated that national courts (and, implicitly, preliminary references from those 
courts to the Andean Tribunal) were appropriate venues for private litigants to 
challenge violations of community law. 
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On the same day in April 2004 that the ECCJ released the Afolabi decision, it 
issued a press release urging governments “to enable individuals to bring actions 
before the Court[,] as there are cases which Member States cannot bring on 
behalf of [their] nationals.”78 As we explain elsewhere, during the next several 
months the judges traveled across West Africa to publicize the need for court 
reform in speeches and lectures. They also met with ECOWAS officials, civil 
society groups, and regional bar associations to plan a coordinated campaign 
to lobby governments to expand the court’s jurisdiction and standing rules. 
The campaign succeeded.79 Less than nine months after the ECCJ dismissed 
Afolabi’s suit, the member states adopted the 2005 Supplementary Protocol.80 
The Protocol significantly broadens the ECCJ’s authority, most notably by 
granting individuals direct access to the ECCJ in cases alleging “the violation 
of human rights that occur in any member state.”81 
These expansions have recast the ECOWAS Court as an important new 
venue for human rights litigation in West Africa. Human rights advocates 
in the region are increasingly mobilizing around the court and including 
ECOWAS litigation in their advocacy strategies. As of March 2012, the ECCJ 
had issued forty-seven interim rulings and forty-five merits judgments, the 
vast majority of which address alleged violations of human rights treaties 
such as the African Charter.82
The ECOWAS Court has issued several high-profile decisions during the 
last few years, including against Gambia for the torture and disappearance of 
journalists, against Niger for condoning modern forms of slavery, and against 
Nigeria for failing to regulate multinational oil companies that polluted the 
78 Lillian Okenwa, ECOWAS Court Not Open to Individual Litigants, this 
Day (nig.) (Apr. 28, 2004), http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/
summary_0286-21180688_ITM.
79 Alter, Helfer & McAllister, supra note 67.
80 Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05, Jan. 19, 2005, Amending Protocol 
A/P.1/7/91 relating to the Community Court of Justice, reprinted in CoMPenDiuM 
of afriCan sub-regional huMan rights DoCuMents, supra note 70, at 199. 
81 Id. art. 3 (revising Article 9(4) of the 1991 Protocol). The 2005 Supplementary 
Protocol does not, however, authorize private litigants to file with the ECCJ 
complaints alleging violations of ECOWAS economic rules or challenges to 
domestic laws or practices that impede regional integration. We discuss the 
possible reasons for this omission in Alter, Helfer & McAllister, supra note 67. 
82 West Africa: ECOWAS Court Decides 92 Cases in Nine Years, leaDershiP (Mar. 
9, 2012), http://www.leadership.ng/nga/articles/18691/2012/03/09/ecowas_
court_decides_92_cases_9_years.html (reporting statement of the President of 
the ECCJ).
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Niger Delta and for curtailing funding for free basic education for all children.83 
The ECCJ has also broadly construed the access provisions of the 2005 
Supplementary Protocol to enable individuals, NGOs, and other private actors 
to bypass national courts and file suits directly with the ECCJ.84 At the same 
time, the court has dismissed complaints that raise novel legal theories, such 
as efforts to hold private actors responsible for human rights violations, and 
suits where plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient proof of alleged violations 
by governments.85 And after initially suggesting that it could review human 
rights claims relating to disputed elections, the ECCJ unequivocally declared 
that “no provision, whether general or specific, gives the Court powers to 
adjudicate on electoral issues or matters arising thereof.”86
The judges have also employed extrajudicial advocacy strategies in an 
attempt to bolster their legitimacy. In the Hadijatou Mani Koraou slavery case,87 
83 See, e.g., Lydia Polgreen, Court Rules Niger Failed by Allowing Girl’s Slavery, 
n.y. tiMes, Oct. 28, 2008, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/28/
world/africa/28niger.html; Nigeria: Ground-Breaking Judgment Calls for 
Punishing Oil Companies Over Pollution, aMnesty int’l (Dec. 17, 2012), 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/nigeria-ground-breaking-judgment-calls-
punishing-oil-companies-over-pollution-2012-12-17; ECOWAS Court Orders 
Gambia to Pay Musa Saidykhan $200,000 in Landmark Case, Jollofnews 
(Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.jollofnews.com/human-rights/1629-ecowas-court-
orders-gambia-to-pay-musa-saidykhan-200000-in-landmark-case-; West Africa: 
ECOWAS Court Orders Nigeria to Provide Free Education for Every Child, 
vanguarD (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/11/ecowas-
court-orders-nigeria-to-provide-free-education-for-every-child/. 
84 SERAP v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, ECW/CCJ/RUL/09/09 (Oct. 27, 2009), 
reprinted in CoMPenDiuM of afriCan sub-regional huMan rights DoCuMents, 
supra note 70, at 298. 
85 See, e.g., SERAP v. President of the Fed. Republic of Nigeria, ECW/CCJ/
RUL/09/10 (Dec. 10, 2010) (dismissing complaint against multinational oil 
companies alleging human rights violations in the Niger Delta); David v. 
Ambassador Ralph Uwechue, ECW/CCJ/RUL/04 /10 (June 11, 2010) (holding 
that the ECCJ has no jurisdiction to adjudicate human rights suits against 
individuals); Garba v. Republic of Benin, ECW/CCJ/JUD/01/10, ¶ 39 (Feb. 
17, 2010) (dismissing a complaint that failed to satisfy the burden of proof 
and stating that applicants must provide evidence of alleged violations that is 
“sufficient, convincing, and unequivocal”).
86 Jerry Ugokwe v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, ECW/CCJ/APP/02/05, ¶ 19 (2005), 
reprinted in 2004-2009 CMty. Ct. of Just., eCowas law rePort 37 (2011). 
We discuss this case in detail in Alter, Helfer & McAllister, supra note 67.
87 Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. Republic of Niger, ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08 (Oct. 
27, 2008), reprinted in CoMPenDiuM of afriCan sub-regional huMan rights 
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for example, the court changed the venue of the proceedings, temporarily 
relocating to the Nigerien capital Niamey to hear testimony and arguments 
from the parties and to deliver a judgment finding that the state had violated 
the applicant’s human rights.88 The judges’ physical presence in the capital 
was, according to lawyers involved in the litigation, an important factor in the 
government’s decision to comply with the remedies awarded by the ECCJ.89
The judges also continue to publicize the court and its activities by giving 
speeches, issuing press statements, and traveling across West Africa to meet 
with bar associations, judges, and NGOs.90 In 2011, for example, the ECCJ 
celebrated its tenth anniversary with a burst of activity intended to raise the 
court’s profile, including meetings with national supreme courts’ judges.91 The 
ECCJ has also attempted to address the concern that some states are ignoring 
its judgments. For example, the ECCJ President has publicly “decried the 
attitude of the Nigerian government for not honoring any of [the court’s] 
10 rulings.” The President suggested that Nigeria’s noncompliance may not 
have been deliberate, and she praised a recent effort to identify a specific 
government official — the Attorney General — to oversee implementation 
of ECCJ judgments.92 
DoCuMents, supra note 70, at 286. The ruling also received widespread global 
media coverage. See, e.g., Christophe Châtelot, Une Cour Regionale Africaine 
Condamne le Niger pour Esclavage [A Regional African Court Condemns 
Slavery in Niger], le MonDe, Oct. 27, 2008, http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/
article/2008/10/28/une-cour-regionale-africaine-condamne-le-niger-pour-
esclavage_1111928_3212.html; Mike Pflanz, Former Slave Wins Historic Case 
Against Niger Government, telegraPh, Oct. 28, 2008, http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/niger/3268371/Former-slave-
wins-historic-case-against-Niger-government.html; Lydia Polgreen, Court Rules 
Niger Failed by Allowing Girl’s Slavery, n.y. tiMes, Oct. 27, 2008, http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/10/28/world/africa/28niger.html. 
88 The ECCJ sits in the Nigerian capital of Abuja. However, the 1991 Protocol 
provides that, “where circumstances or the facts of the case so demand, the 
Court may sit in the territory of another Member State.” Protocol A/P.1/7/91, 
supra note 70, art. 26(2). 
89 Helen Duffy, Hadijatou Mani Koroua v Niger: Slavery Unveiled by the ECOWAS 
Court, 9 huM. rts. l. rev. 151, 157 (2009).
90 E.g., Press Release, Media Foundation for West Africa, MFWA Holds Forum On 
ECOWAS Court in Abuja (July 27, 2012), available at http://www.mediafound.
org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=857. 
91 CMty. Ct. of Just., eCowas, suMMary of aCtivities for the year 2011, at 5 
(2012), available at http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/pdf_files/annual_reports/
activities_report_2011.pdf.
92 Eyo Charles, West Africa: Nigeria Doesn’t Respect Our Rulings — ECOWAS 
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The ECCJ is still a young court, and its future remains uncertain. As we 
discuss elsewhere, ECOWAS officials and most governments have publicly 
expressed their support for the court and have taken concrete steps to bolster 
its independence. Most notably, in 2007 they created a Judicial Council to 
depoliticize the appointments process and encourage the election of highly 
qualified judges. At the same time, continued noncompliance by Nigeria, 
the regional hegemon, and an attempt (albeit ultimately unsuccessful) by the 
Gambia to narrow the court’s jurisdiction suggest that the ECCJ’s authority 
and legitimacy are not yet firmly established.93
III. conclusIon: lawmakIng and legItImacy revIsIted 
This Article has documented a divergence in the penchant for judicial 
lawmaking by three international courts. The courts’ distinct trajectories 
provide empirical evidence at odds with the conventional wisdom that expansive 
judicial lawmaking undermines IC legitimacy, and the implied corollary that 
conservative interpretations contribute to such legitimacy. 
Most of the CJEU’s expansionist jurisprudence, including its review 
of alleged human rights violations and its assertion of the direct effect and 
supremacy of European law, has been accepted by national decision-makers. 
Indeed, these ambitious — many would say audacious — legal doctrines 
are generally seen as enhancing the CJEU’s legitimacy. In contrast, the ATJ 
engages in very little lawmaking, but its cautiousness does not appear to 
have bolstered its legitimacy. Officials in domestic IP administrative agencies 
and private IP attorneys see the ATJ as competent and authoritative, and its 
rulings in that issue area are influential and respected. But the court is barely 
known outside of this small and technical community, and the ATJ’s narrow, 
formalist interpretations have left little imprint on other government policies. 
In West Africa, the ECCJ avoided CJEU-style expansionism in its first case 
and instead sought explicit member state support for broadening its jurisdiction 
to include human rights. The ECCJ has also required litigants to provide 
convincing evidence before finding violations of international human rights 
law. Yet notwithstanding this circumspect approach, the ECCJ’s legitimacy 
remains uncertain. 
Court, Daily trust (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/index.php/
other-sections/law-pages/166086-nigeria-doesnt-respect-our-rulings-ecowas-
court.
93 For further discussion, see Alter, Helfer & McAllister, supra note 67. 
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These findings reveal that, of the ICs we have discussed, those that have 
experienced legitimacy challenges have also issued politically consequential 
rulings that governments or other influential domestic actors disfavor. This leads 
us to suggest a conjecture for future research — that ICs spark controversy 
due to the domestic political consequences of their rulings, whether or not 
those rulings are expansionist. 
This claim is consistent with explanations of how the CJEU engaged in 
expansionist lawmaking without provoking the wrath of member states. Karen 
Alter explained this puzzle by pointing out the different incentives and time 
horizons of politicians and judges. Many politicians care about providing 
short-term benefits to influential constituencies and being reelected to office. 
They have little incentive to oppose expansive IC lawmaking that does not 
interfere with these goals. Judges can take a longer-term perspective. They can 
build legal doctrines slowly, focusing on cases that create the foundation for 
future expansive lawmaking but that have limited short-term political impact.94 
If correct, our conjecture has several important implications for IC legitimacy. 
First, political protests against IC rulings may be caused neither by judicial 
lawmaking nor by crises of legitimacy. A court that is controversial is not 
the same as one whose legitimacy is suspect. An IC that issues decisions 
reflecting the preferences of a majority of states, mobilized interest groups, or 
broader publics may be widely seen as legitimate. Nevertheless, those actors 
whose goals and objectives are threatened by an IC activities may still object 
to the court or its rulings. Since such challenges often invoke the mantra of 
judicial activism, we expect assertions of expansive lawmaking to be raised 
even when judges are applying well established doctrine or hewing closely 
to the court’s jurisdictional mandate. But our intuition is that these claims 
will often be irrelevant or raised as smokescreens for other objections to the 
IC or its rulings. 
Second, expansive lawmaking that is supported by key domestic actors — 
such as national judges, bar associations, civil society groups, or administrative 
agencies — may bolster rather than undermine an IC’s legitimacy. Such 
lawmaking may be especially welcome where a government’s political branches 
fail to resolve pressing problems. By addressing such problems, ICs may 
attract support from these domestic actors even if their intervention requires 
significant judicial creativity. 
Third, a court that issues narrow, technical or constrained judgments is 
not necessarily protected from controversies or backlashes. Judges may upset 
powerful political actors when they rule against them. But if judges are timid 
94 On the different time horizons and incentives of judges versus politicians, see 
alter, supra note 46, at 118.
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when litigants present clear violations of the law, they may undermine their 
reputation for independence and compromise their legitimacy in the eyes of 
key interlocutors and compliance constituencies. 
We are far from proving these conjectures. The next step is to examine 
the legal, political, and social contexts in which different ICs suffer crises of 
legitimacy or provoke backlashes. Our modest contribution in this Article is 
to explain why such research should not assume that legitimacy crises and 
political backlashes are linked. Rather, the connection between the two is an 
open issue to be explored.

